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JOSt GABILONDO*
So Now Who is Special?: Business Model Shifts
Among Firms That Borrow to Lend
I. INTRODUCTION
THIS ESSAY ANALYZES THE NEW CREDIT MARKET in terms of alternative business
models for financial intermediation, competition between these models, and their
evolution in response to open market dynamics. Viewing the financial economy in
terms of business models makes it easier to understand why credit has contracted
and why the traditional tools of monetary, credit, and banking policy have not
revived lending. A business model is a set of propositions that, in miniature, states
a firm's economic logic and the rationale for its structure.' I focus on business
models for financial intermediaries like banks and insurance companies because
these firms play a key role in the economy.' They direct funds between savers and
consumers based on the holding preferences of market participants for risk, term,
and liquidity.' This makes them the circulatory system of the economy and an
. Jos6 Gabilondo, Associate Dean and Associate Professor, Rafael Diaz-Balart Hall, College of Law,
Florida International University, Miami, Florida 33199, jose.gabilondo@fiu.edu. A.B., Harvard College, 1987;
J.D., University of California (Boalt Hall), Berkeley, 1991. My sincere thanks to Professors Lisa Fairfax and
Michael Greenberger for including me in their magnificent and timely program on the credit crunch. I am
especially grateful to the staff of the Journal of Business 6- Technology Law for doing an outstanding job in
deepening and enhancing this article.
1. See Christian Nielsen & Per Nikolaj Bukh, What Constitutes a Business Model. The Perception of Finan-
cial Analysts 1-21 (Aalborg Univ., Dep't of Bus. Studies, Working Paper No. 4, 2008) (describing a business
model as a "company's way of competing, whether it concerns being unique or being the most cost-efficient
company in the industry"); Bruce Rasmussen, Business Models and the Theory of the Firm 1-11 (Pharm. Indus.
Project Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 32, 2007) (noting that a business model is "designed to
answer a series of questions essential to any business-who are the customers, what do they value, how that
value can be delivered to the customer at the appropriate cost and how the business deploys its assets");
Michael Rappa, Business Models on the Web, DIGITAL ENTERPRISE, http://digitalenterprise.org/models/mod-
els.html (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (defining a business model as the "method of doing business by which a
company can sustain itself-that is, generate revenue"); see also infra Part II.
2. See James F. Groth, Can Regulators Force Bank Holding Companies to Bail Out Their Failing Subsidiar-
ies?-An Analysis of the Federal Reserve Board's Source-of-Strength Doctrine, 86 Nw. U. L. Rav. 112, 121 (1991)
(noting Congressional recognition of the need to regulate banks because of the important role they play in the
United States).
3. John L. Orcutt, Improving the Efficiency of the Angel Finance Market: A Proposal to Expand the Interme-
diary Role of Finders in the Private Capital Raising Setting, 37 ARiz. ST. L.J. 861, 885-87 (2005) (noting that
investment banks-or financial intermediaries-alleviate informational asymmetry between the corporation
and potential public investors).
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
So Now WHO IS SPECIAL?
interface between the real economy, which produces real goods and services, and
the financial economy, which traffics in intangible claims like money and debt.4
After explaining the concept of a business model, I examine an ongoing tension
between two dominant approaches used by financial intermediaries: the originate-
to-distribute ("OTD") model and portfolio lending.' The current financial crisis is
forcing managers to rethink basic assumptions about their business lines; among
financial firms, much of this deliberation deals with the conflict between these two
business models.6 The business models of financial firms face two special con-
straints that I then address: the dyadic relationship to federal financial regulators
and the challenge of new liquidity dynamics in the credit market.7 I make two
points about these constraints. First, when trying to stabilize financial markets, the
federal government targeted the way that these firms finance themselves, most re-
cently, reflecting that their borrowing patterns-both those of banks and non-bank
financial institutions-have systemic consequences requiring federal involvement.'
Second, these business models adapted to the liquidity trends in the new credit
market by investing more heavily in secondary credit markets, which then grew in
importance and impact.9 Rather than reaching any normative conclusions, the
point of my essay is to suggest a conceptual approach to better understanding cau-
sation in credit markets.
II. DUELING BUSINESS MODELS FOR FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES
A business model approach is more common in business than in legal studies,
although the approach has some conceptual advantages." It recognizes that all
firms can be expressed in terms of a reductionist value proposition that distin-
guishes between essential and incidental features of a firm." It is also a prism for
understanding the intersection of open market trends, regulation, and managerial
decisions, much as Coase's analysis of the firm illustrated the intersection between
efficiencies and firm structure. 2 My discussion here draws on Henry Chesbrough's
4. See id. at 885 (noting that financial intermediaries provide several services, such as underwriting,
which bridge corporations in search of capital).
5. See infra Part II.
6. Benjamin Levy, Market Crisis Will Force Rethink on Strategy, MONEY MGMT., Dec. 3, 2008, http://
www.moneymanagment.com.au/article/Market-crisis-will-force-rethink-on-strategy/432802.aspx ("The global
financial crisis will force companies to rethink their investment goals and long-term market strategy, as bad
strategic decisions taken before and during the market crisis have exposed and challenged core beliefs."); see
also infra Part II.
7. See infia Part III.
8. See infra Part III.A.
9. See infra Part III.B.
10. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 1; Hengyi Feng et al., A New Business Model? The Capital Market and
the New Economy, 30 EcoN. & Soc'y 467 (2001).
11. See HENRY CHESBROUGH, OPEN INNOVATION: THE NEW IMPERATIVE FOR CREATING AND PROFITING
FROM TECHNOLOGY 65 (2003).
12. See Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECoNoMICA 386, 390-98 (showing that the structure of
the firm reflects its attempt to economize on transaction costs). Coase also examines the relationship between
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research on business models for technological innovation.' Although he focuses on
the role of technology, his definition of a business model helps to explain both the
business models for financial intermediaries and the market models on which regu-
lators rely when intervening in financial markets. 4
According to Chesbrough's paradigm, a business model carries out certain logi-
cal functions for a firm with an output (which can take any form, including a good
or a service).'" First, it must articulate a "value proposition" that explains how end
users derive value from the firm's product.'6 Second, the business model must situ-
ate the firm as part of a wider market structure by locating the firm in a "value
chain" from manufacture to distribution of the firm's output and by envisioning a
"value network" of suppliers and customers that allows the firm to distinguish be-
tween allies and competitors. 7 Finally, it must estimate the cost structure and de-
sired profit spreads, identify the target market segment, and articulate a strategy
that distinguishes the firm from its competitors. 8 If a business model meets these
requirements, then it has performed its cardinal function: "to create a heuristic, a
simplified cognitive map, from the technical domain of inputs to the social domain
of outputs." 9
The firm's business model helps it to negotiate uncertainty by filtering informa-
tion, ruling out certain strategic possibilities, and moving the firm toward other
strategic choices.2" At the core of the model is a "dominant logic" that distills "the
prevailing wisdom within the company about how the world works and how the
firm competes in this world to make money."' The downside is that a firm that has
long relied on a particular business model can get stuck in it such that opportuni-
ties to adapt are lost.22 I would add that a business model includes explicit state-
transaction costs and a firm's size or structure. Id. I accept this proposition as a general property of business
models.
13. See CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 63-91. In particular, I rely on his discussion of the cognitive
implications for managers and employees of business models. Id. at 68-71.
14. See id. at 64-65 (outlining six "functions" of a business model).
15. See id. at 63-64.
16. Id. at 65.
17. Id. at 64-65.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 69.
20. See id. at 70. As Chesbrough points out:
Constructing a business model requires managers to deal with significant complexity and ambiguity.
We know from earlier research that managers cannot-and do not-exhaustively evaluate every al-
ternative when they confront such situations. Instead, they apply cognitive filters to reduce this com-
plexity to manageable levels. Managers include information that fits within the logic of their current
business model and filter out information at variance with that model.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
21. Id.
22. See id. at 71. It involves the commercial equivalent of hubris:
[Tihe model that will be applied to a new opportunity will bear a strong resemblance to the estab-
lished business model already in use. And the more successful the current business model has been
over time, the stronger its influence over how to commercialize the new opportunity that arises. ...
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ments ("Our firm sells credit default swaps.") as well as implicit propositions whose
value may emerge by accident, for example, the unintentional way in which an
early World Bank foreign exchange transaction helped to create the modern swaps
market.23 Or it may be a stranger to the firm who sees its latent value, as did the
corporate raiders of the 1980s who harvested the excess cash held by takeover
targets.24
Chesbrough's approach maps well onto financial firms. These firms' value pro-
positions are readily identified and compared because each one relates to a financial
service that is relatively easy to quantify.2" For purposes of this essay, these proposi-
tions express the financial value that consumers derive from credit. The value is
easily measured by its interest cost, non-interest loan terms that create a burden or
benefit to the borrower, and the transaction costs of applying for credit and servic-
ing the relationship with the lender.26 Because cash and credit are fungible, finan-
cial firms must distinguish themselves competitively other than just by
differentiating products. 7 Using Chesbrough's model, the most dramatic changes
for firms in the credit market have been in the value chain because securitization,
the growth of secondary markets, and the rise of non-bank lenders dramatically
[T]he more successful the firm has been with its business model, the more wedded to the model it
will be as new opportunities arise.
Id.
23. See Joshua Schiffrin, The Swaps Market: A Case Study Detailing Market Evolution, Current Market
Dynamics and Pricing Issues Via the Binomial Tree Model 6 (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
Duke Univ.).
24. See Christina M. Sautter, Shopping During Extended Store Hours: From No Shops to Go-Shops, 73
BROOK. L. REV. 525, 527 (2007) (distinguishing between the hostile transactions of the 1980s led by"corporate
raiders" and modern "strategic buyers"); Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls, and Professors: A Reply to
Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2002) (noting that the goals of the hostile takeovers of the 1980s was
to "bust up" the pieces of the corporation and turn a quick profit).
25. See CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 65. Chesbrough introduces a metaphor using vitamins and pain
relievers to demonstrate what he means by value propositions:
We all know that vitamins are good for us and that we should take them. Most of us, though, do not
take vitamins on a regular basis, and whatever benefits vitamins provide do not seem to be greatly
missed in the short term. People therefore pay relatively tittle for vitamins. In contrast, people know
when they need a pain reliever. And they know that they need it now, not later. They can also tell
quite readily whether the reliever is working. People will be willing to pay a great deal more for a pain
reliever than they pay for a vitamin. In this context, the pain reliever provides a much stronger value
proposition than does a vitamin ....
Id.
26. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Imputed Conflicts of Interest in International Law Practice, 30 OKLA. CITY
U. L. REv. 489, 498 (2005) (noting that in loan transactions, both the borrower and lender stand to benefit);
Rienhold Niebuhr, Beware the Dotted Line: Foreclosure Rescue Fraud in Maryland and the Growing Effort to
Combat It, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 113, 139 n.193 (2007) (noting that the secondary mortgage increases benefits
for borrowers by increasing access to credit).
27. See, e.g., Forrester's 2008 Financial Services Forum for Marketing and Strategy Professionals, How to
Deliver Great Customer Experience, http://www.forrester.com/events/eventdetail/0,9179,2117,00.html (last vis-
ited Feb. 1, 2009) (explaining that financial firms need to distinguish themselves by improving customer
experiences).
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changed the nature of how credit was originated, distributed, and liquidated."8 In-
deed, the ongoing shaking-out in part reflects the notion that financial firms are
still figuring out where they stand in the new credit market.2 9
One of the most elegant formulations of the business model for commercial
banks is set out in Federal Reserve official Jerry Corrigan's classic 1982 speech, "Are
Banks Special?"3 The question mattered because commercial banks enjoyed privi-
leged access to liquidity and capital facilities, all posing the risk of cost to the public
fisc.3t Corrigan's formulation clearly illustrates the value propositions that banks
offer and how they fit into their value chains and networks.32
Corrigan identified three special features about banks that justified their special
federal rights to funding and liquidity support.33 First, banks offered transaction
accounts used by consumers and other firms to settle payments.34 Second, banks
could be counted on to provide backup liquidity to individuals and other firms
under most circumstances, although the cost of this liquidity would reflect both the
borrower's risk and the cost of money prevailing at the time of the loan. 5 Third,
banks were special because the Federal Reserve relied on them to implement mone-
tary policy by acting through the balance sheets of the bank.36 For Corrigan, these
three features helped to explain why banks had special rights. 7 I would add to these
features a fourth classic function of banking-the job of increasing the supply of
long-term and fixed-rate credit available to borrowers, which a bank can do by
borrowing at shorter terms and at both fixed and floating terms and then profes-
sionally managing the risks of term and rate mismatches on its balance sheet.3 "
These four aspects-transaction accounts, backup liquidity, monetary policy, and
28. See Julia Patterson Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and
Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1323-29 (2006) (detailing the changes to the mortgage
market brought about by the development of securitization); see also CHESBROUGH, supra note 11, at 66-67
(discussing the importance of a business's value chain).
29. See, e.g., Madlen Read & Sara Lepro, Death Knell for Citigroup's 'Supermarket' Model, YAHOO! NEWS,
Jan. 14, 2009, http://news.yahoo.comls/ap/20090114/ap-on-bi-gelcitigroup/print (discussing Citigroup's deci-
sion to end its "supermarket" practice in which it acted as a one-stop shop for consumers' financial services).
30. E. Gerald Corrigan, Are Banks Special?, in FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, 1982 ANNUAL RE-
PORT (1982), available at http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/arl982a.cfm.
31. Id.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. See id.
38. See Jeffrey Lacker, President, Fed. Reserve Bank of Richmond, Remarks at the European Economics
and Financial Centre's Distinguished Speakers Seminar: Financial Stability and Central Banks (June 5, 2008),
available at http://www.richmondfed.org/pressroornspeeches/president-jef 
-lacker/2008/pdf/juneO5.pdf (dis-
cussing the concept of maturity transformation as a traditional role of banks). When doing this, the bank
converts liquid liabilities into illiquid assets, hence exposing itself to liquidity risk. Id. (discussing the increased
possibility of bank runs created by maturity transformation).
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maturity transformation-define the traditional business model for depository
institutions.
Even as Corrigan was delivering his speech, trends in the credit market were
making banks seem less special.39 One such trend was the shift on the part of banks
from portfolio lending to the OTD model of underwriting." Historically, a portfo-
lio lender evaluated a prospective borrower's creditworthiness, keeping in mind
that if the lender made the loan it would reside on the lender's balance sheet
through maturity, until early payment or, heaven forbid, borrower default.4
Securitization of the loan (another name for the OTD model) allows the bank to
make the loan and immediately sell it for a time- and risk-discounted cash present
value.42 Securitization spread from housing finance to other credit sectors, chang-
ing the business of banking; as a result, a system in which relationships between the
borrower and lender may have counted for something became a more anonymous
enterprise built on transaction fees rather than long-term relationships and re-
newed continually by secondary market demand for commoditized credit
products.43
Ostensibly, the OTD model affected only the asset-side of an originating bank:
pooling and selling whole loans sped up the cash collection cycle, adding liquidity
to the bank's balance sheet.44 This acceleration of the cash cycle, though, had impli-
cations for the bank's liabilities too, because the bank needed to fund a growing
volume of loan disbursements, often with short turnaround.45 Shorter turnarounds
meant more individual financing transactions for a bank and for shorter terms.46
This compression exposed the bank to its own credit and liquidity risks, but the
magnificent baggage of federal safety and soundness rules set up a comprehensive
system of reporting (call reports), examinations, prudential standards, and the abil-
39. See FED. RESERVE BANK OF MINNEAPOLIS, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, at app. tbl. 1 (1982), available at
http://www.minneapolisfed.org/pubs/ar/ar1982b.cfm. This table was referenced in Corrigan's speech in supra
note 30. As the data indicates, commercial banks experienced a gain in the credit market until 1979, after which
their credit market share began to decrease slightly. Id.
40. Private Equity and Leveraged Finance Markets 1, 26 (Bank for Int'l Settlements, Comm. on the Global
Fin. Sys., Paper No. 30, July 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/publ/cgfs30.pdf.noframes=l.
41. See generally Sarah Landis, Thrifts Enjoyed Strong Second Quarter Due to Adjustable-Rate Mortgage
Loans, WALL ST. J., July 31, 2000, at B11F (referring to thrifts as portfolio lenders and defining them as lenders
who keep the loans they originate on their own balance sheets); Jack Guttentag, The Mortgage Crisis is One of
Confidence, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 2008, at F03 (discussing the history of portfolio lenders as a system that had a
strong presence in housing finance until the bank crisis of the 1980s that has since strengthened its underwrit-
ing requirements).
42. See Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 1061, 1126
(1996) (discussing securitization and noting the benefits of selling loans quickly).
43. See id. at 1122 (noting that many other types of receivables, in addition to mortgages, were
securitized).
44. See generally Jessica L. DeBruin, Recent Developments in and Legal Implication of Accounting for Securi-
tizations, 1999 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 367, 371-72 (1999).
45. See id.
46. Id. at 371 (noting that "the number of securitization transactions has rapidly increased").
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ity to intervene and take over an insured depository institution that posed risks to
itself, its borrowers, the federal government, or the financial system more broadly."
A second trend, related to the explosive growth of secondary credit markets fed
by the OTD model, was the rise of uninsured non-bank financial institutions like
investment banks or mutual funds.48 They began to offer transaction accounts
which competed with federally-insured checking accounts.49 In addition to, in ef-
fect, receiving customer deposits, these non-bank lenders also began to extend
credit such that during the thirty-year period ending in 1998, the share of credit
provided by banks dropped from 43% to 26% while that of non-bank lenders in-
creased from 30% to 48%." ° Not surprisingly, a credit rating agency announced
that a new "credit paradigm" had emerged, one in which even firms like hedge
funds had become an important source of credit."s The impact of these non-bank
lenders on the financial system as a whole came into focus during the current
crisis. 2 The crisis also called into question whether traditional banks still provided
backup liquidity (the second special feature of the depository business model) be-
cause, in the hour of truth when credit lines were sought to be drawn, many tradi-
tional banks struggled to honor underwriting commitments. 3
Unlike commercial banks, non-bank lenders lacked experience with portfolio
lending, and hence floundered in the new credit market.5 4 Thus, part of what con-
tributed to the current financial crisis is that amateurs got in over their heads in the
technical business of portfolio lending.5 For example, E*Trade, the third largest
47. See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Reporting Forms, http://www.federalreserve.gov/report
forms/about.cfm (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (noting that the information in the reports is essential to the regula-
tion of the financial banking industry and the protection of borrowers' rights).
48. Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Transformation of the U.S. Financial Services Industry, 1975-2000: Compe-
tition, Consolidation, and Increased Risks, 2002 U. ILL. L. REV. 215, 233 (noting that, as a result, "finance
companies have become significant competitors for banks in asset-based lending markets").
49. See id. at 239-40 (noting that certain accounts available at non-bank institutions offered some of the
same transactional advantages of traditional bank accounts).
50. BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE Sys., GUIDE TO THE FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS 28 (2000).
51. FITCH REPORTING, HEDGE FUNDS: THE CREDIT MARKET'S NEW PARADIGM 7 (2007) ("The growing
role of hedge funds in the credit markets without question has introduced greater [funding and market] liquid-
ity in the near term. Of concern would be an ill-timed event that led to a sudden reversal of this liquidity across
multiple segments of the credit markets.").
52. See Nouriel Roubini, The Shadow Banking System is Unraveling, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/622acc9e-87fl- lldd-b1 14-0000779fd18c.htrnl?ndick-check= (explaining the
shadow banking system's role in the current financial crisis and specifically noting the decreased protection
shadow banks have to prevent runs).
53. See, e.g., Eric Dash, Investor Safe Haven Becomes a Concern, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at C1 (discuss-
ing asset-backed commercial paper and the concern that, following an issuer's default, securities may not be
able to be sold for full value).
54. See Roubini, supra note 52 (referring to the demise of the shadow banking system and the causes
thereof).
55. Formerly, banks borrowed at shorter terms and lent at longer ones, making longer term credit availa-
ble to credit consumers and, in so doing, bearing funding liquidity risk from mismatches in their payables and
receivables. See Lacker, supra note 38. Indeed, this was part of the function of banking: "The fundamental role
of banks in facilitating the maturity transformation of short-term deposits into long-term loans makes banks
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
So Now WHO IS SPECIAL?
online brokerage firm, nearly declared bankruptcy in January 2008 because of
losses in its loan portfolio, which held mortgage-backed securities. 6 In the prior
years, E*Trade had come to derive as much as 58% of its revenues from its loan
portfolio, rather than from its traditional brokerage business. 7 And this was part of
a wider trend.5" Between 2000 and 2007, several major investment banks increased
their investments from (risky) proprietary trading while their profit margins de-
clined on less risky, fee-based businesses like underwriting, brokerage, and financial
advisory services. 9
Because they operate beyond the limits of the official regulatory system, non-
bank financial institutions came to be known as the shadow banking sector.6" These
shadow banks made it harder to track the credit supply and to understand how the
financial economy linked to the real economy." While regulators had stumbled
their way through the OTD model, they knew less about the way these shadow
banks operated and made no provisions to manage the systemic risk created by the
nouveau portfolio lenders.62 At last, even that guardian of ancign regime of the
commercial bank-the Federal Reserve-admitted that these shadow banks needed
to be studied, in part because they might interfere with the implementation of
monetary policy, one of the three features that Corrigan had said made banks
special.63
inherently vulnerable to liquidity risk, the risk that demands for repayment outstrip [sic] the capacity to raise
new liabilities or liquefy assets." BASEL COMM. ON BANKING SUPERVISION, BANK FOR INT'L SETTLEMENTS,
LIQUIDITY RISK: MANAGEMENT AND SUPERVISORY CHALLENGES 2 (2008). This is less true of commercial banks
insofar as they originate to distribute and more true of other financial firms that have begun to originate and
trade credit. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
56. See Katrina Booker, The Day $2 Billion WALKED Out the Door, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2008, at 98.
57. Id.
58. Id. (contending that E*Trade's story is common among its Wall Street counterparts).
59. See Shawn Tully, What's Wrong with Wall Street and How to Fix It, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2008, at 70.
60. This is what is meant by the shadow banking system:
A very large amount of credit was being created outside the banking system. All of the central banks
and the other authorities probably did underestimate that and the market itself has been surprised to
discover how much these instruments were being used to generate credit outside the banking system.
Credit conditions were much looser than the authorities had believed.
Sean O'Grady et al., Credit Crunch One Year On, THE INDEP., Aug. 5, 2008, at 38 (quoting Sir Howard Davies in
group interview on the anniversary of the credit crunch with financial cognoscenti) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
61. See Paul J. Davies, Insight: Traversing the Wall of Leverage, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2008, available at http://
www.ft.com/cms/s/0/77cOdb90-909b- 11 dd-8abb-0000779fd 8c.ht ml?ndick.check= 1.
62. See Gillian Tett & Paul Davies, Out of the Shadows: How Banking's Secret System Broke Down, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 16, 2007, available at http://www.ft.comlcmsls/O/42827c50-abfd-Ildc-82fO-OOOO779fd2ac.html
(claiming that the lack of regulation came in part because of the opaque nature of the structure and
transactions).
63. See, e.g., Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at The Credit Channel of Monetary Policy
in the Twenty-first Century Conference: The Financial Accelerator and the Credit Channel (June 15, 2007),
available at http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/Bernanke2080615a.htm. Bernanke encouraged
academics to study non-bank lenders in the credit market, noting that "[nionbank lenders may well be subject
to the same forces" to which banks are in the credit channel. Id.
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At the same time that the traditional business model for banking has faced these
centrifugal pressures, it has also been reinforced by one important trend: the deci-
sion by some major investment banks to organize as bank holding companies
under the Bank Holding Company Act of 195664 rather than as investment banks,
as did Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley in 2008.65 As investment banks,
Goldman and Morgan Stanley had been regulated by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). 66 Electing bank holding company status means that these firms
must now conform to an invasive federal system of oversight.67 Part of what made
the prospect of Federal Reserve oversight more tolerable was that, as bank holding
companies, Goldman and Morgan would gain regular access to the special funding
and liquidity resources formerly available only to depository institutions, including
the power to raise FDIC-insured deposits from customers and to access the Federal
Reserve's borrowing programs. 6' The election also suggests that the business of
commercial banking has changed, converging towards investment banking enough
that it could make business sense for these two firms to ease into a substantially
different legal form. 69 And as the Federal Reserve absorbs these new registrants, it
too will retool its own conceptual resources, finally getting a chance to answer some
questions that banking regulators have had for some time about capital markets."
64. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 et seq. (2006); see also Ronnie J. Phillips, The Regulation and Supervision of Bank
Holding Companies: An Historical Perspective 14-18 (Jerome Levy Econ. Inst. of Bard Coll. & Colo. St. Univ.,
Working Paper No. 116, 1994) (analyzing why Congress gave the Federal Reserve examination and oversight
authority over bank holding companies).
65. See Jon Hilsenrath et al., Goldman, Morgan Scrap Wall Street Model, Become Banks in Bid to Ride Out
Crisis; End of Traditional Investment Banking, as Storied Firms Face Closer Supervision and Stringent New Capital
Requirements, WALL ST. J., Sept. 22, 2008, at Al.
66. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, Chairman Cox Announces End of Consolidated Super-
vised Entities Program (Sept. 26, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-320.htm (an-
nouncing the end of voluntary regulation of investment banks by the SEC).
67. See Hilsenrath, supra note 65 ("The Federal Reserve will regulate the parent companies, the Comptrol-
ler of the Currency will oversee the national bank charters, and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. will likely
play a bigger role because the companies are expected to seek much higher volumes of federally backed
deposits.").
68. Michael J. de la Merced et al., As Goldman and Morgan Shift, a Wall St. Era Ends, N.Y. TIMES
BLOG: DEALBOOK, http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com2008/09/21/goldman-morgan-to-become-bank-holding-
companies (Sept. 21, 2001, 9:35 pm). The Federal Reserve will also benefit from the conversion of investment
banks to bank holding companies. For instance, although it had already emerged as the dominant regulator of
financial markets, attracting these two high status registrants added to its cachet. Fed Now Will Regulate
Goldman, Morgan as Banking Firms, L.A. TIMES BLOG: MONEY & Co., http://latimesblog.latimes.com/
money-co/2008/09/now-wall-street.html (Sept. 21, 2008, 20:42 PST) ("The shift by Goldman and Morgan to
banking-company status gives Federal Reserve Chairman Ben S. Bernanke far more power over Wall Street
.... ). It will now also learn more about segments of the capital markets that had formerly been more of the
purview of the SEC. Kara Scannell, SEC, Fed Stake Turf on Oversight; Both Regulators Want to Expand Wall
Street Role, WALL ST. J., Jul. 25, 2008, at C3 (explaining the Fed's desire to expand its regulatory role to
investment banks traditionally regulated by the SEC).
69. See Malcolm D. Knight, Gen. Manager, Bank of Int'l Settlements, Speech at the International Confer-
ence of Banking Supervisors: Banking and Insurance Regulation and Supervision: Greater Convergence, Com-
mon Challenges (Sept. 22-23, 2004), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp040927.htm.
70. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, RISK-BASED CAPITAL: BANK REGULATORS NEED TO
IMPROVE TRANSPARENCY AND OVERCOME IMPEDIMENTS TO FINALIZING THE PROPOSED BASEL II FRAMEWORK
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Periods of financial crisis and market restructuring like the current one put busi-
ness models to the test.7 Competitive pressure makes managers think more care-
fully about their background practices, encouraging conscientious managers to
articulate and defend the dominant logic of the firm's practices or to consider a
new approach.72 Because a business model must reconcile the firm's strategic goals
with the wider market, it requires ongoing adjustment to remain a faithful account
of a firm.73 So far, my discussion has emphasized the changes that have gone on
"inside" financial firms.74 What is also useful about a business model approach for
financial firms is that it situates the firm in its dialectical relationship to its regula-
tors and to the market at large, themes to which I now turn.75
III. HOW BUSINESS MODELS CONTEND WITH MARKET LIQUIDITY
AND REGULATION
Business models for financial firms also face special constraints. First, financial
markets are heavily regulated, mostly by a panoply of federal commissions, but also
by state banking, securities, and insurance authorities.76 Second, how financial
firms finance themselves is a fundamental aspect of their operations, more so than
with manufacturing or non-financial services firms for whom cash and credit are
not the principal input.7 I attach a schematic to express the relationships between
decision-making by financial firms, the liquidity dynamics of the credit market,
6-7 (2007) (discussing unresolved questions banking regulators face regarding implementation of Basel It
capital market risk requirements).
71. See Mir Gudmundsson, Deputy Head of the Monetary & Econ. Dep't, Bank of Int'l Settlements,
Keynote Address at the Financial Technology Congress: How Might the Current Financial Crisis Shape Finan-
cial Sector Regulation and Structure? (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.bis.org/speeches/sp08lll9.htm
(discussing how the impairment of the wholesale money-market impacted bank business models).
72. See, e.g., Press Release, Goldman Sachs, Goldman Sachs to Become Fourth Largest Bank Holding Com-
pany (Sept. 21, 2008), available at http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-firm/press/press-releases/archived/2008/
bank-holding-co.print.html (announcing Goldman Sachs' conversion from a traditional investment bank to a
bank holding company in response to the global financial crisis); Press Release, Morgan Stanley, Morgan Stan-
ley Granted Federal Bank Holding Company Status by U.S. Federal Reserve Board of Governors (Sept. 21,
2008), available at http://www.morganstanley.com/about/press/print/6933.html (announcing Morgan Stanley's
conversion from a traditional investment bank to a bank holding company in response to the global financial
crisis).
73. See, e.g., Carlos Ruiz de la Torre, Towards the Digital Music Distribution Age: Business Model Adjust-
ments and Legislative Proposals to Improve Legal Downloading Services and Counter Piracy, 8 VAND. J. ENT. &
TECH. L. 503, 504-05 (2006) (discussing how business models for music downloading services changed in
response to anti-piracy activities of the music industry and statutory developments).
74. See supra Part II.
75. See infra Part III.
76. Robert Steel, Under Sec'y of Treasury for Domestic Fin., U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Remarks on U.S.
Financial Regulation at Meeting of the New York Society of Securities Analysts (Feb. 7, 2008), available at http:/
/www.treas.gov/press/releases/hp81O.htm (discussing the numerous levels and types of regulations for financial
companies).
77. Cf Tobias Adrian & Hyun Song Shin, Liquidity and Leverage 3 (Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Staff Report
No. 328, 2008), available at http://www.newyorkfed.orglresearch/staffreports/sr328.pdf (introducing the con-
cept of "leveraged financial intermediaries" and arguing that they manage their balance sheet in ways that
intensify the boom and bust of the leverage cycle).
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and the behavior of federal financial regulators.78 I see two themes as particularly
important: the feedback loop between regulatory interventions and the capital
structure of financial firms, and the feedback loop between business models and
the liquidity dynamics of the financial market.7 9
A. The Feedback Loop Between Regulatory Intervention and Firm Capital
Structure
Crucially, a business model also addresses how a firm is to be financed, i.e., the
strategy to be pursued for building and managing the right-hand side of its balance
sheet with some combination of borrowing (debt) or selling of ownership interests
(shares).8" Financing matters for all firms, but the financial structure of banks and
other financial firms (how they raise and use debt and equity capital) is particularly
relevant because it is through this structure-particularly its liabilities-that finan-
cial intermediaries carry out their role of accumulating funds and directing these
funds to end users, like consumers looking for a mortgage or a company seeking to
finance a buyout.8 Credit goes to economist Hyman Minsky for emphasizing that
the liability structures of financial institutions are, perhaps, the key driver in the
overall financial system.82 Indeed, liquidity is both the input and output for finan-
cial intermediaries, unlike manufacturing or service firms that convert cash and
credit into other goods or services.83 The same principle is reflected in federal
78. See infra App. A. I used this schematic to organize a presentation at the University of Maryland School
of Law Journal of Business & Technology Law's Symposium: The Subprime Meltdown: Causes, Consequences,
and Solutions. Please contact the author to receive an electronic version of the schematic.
79. See infra Part III.A.-B.
80. A balance sheet is a point-in-time snapshot of a firm's economic structure, broken down into assets,
liabilities, and equity. See EUGENE F. BRIGHAM & JOEL F. HOUSTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF FINANCIAL MANAGE-
MENT 37-39 (10th ed. 2004) (describing the elements and structure of a balance sheet). Shown on the left side
of the balance sheet, assets are the firm's claims against others, typically listed by declining liquidity. See id. at
37. Shown at the top of the right side of the balance sheet, liabilities are third parties' credit claims against the
firm, typically listed by maturity and relative priority. See id. The difference between assets and liabilities is the
owners' account-shareholder's equity. See id. at 38. It appears below the liabilities and estimates the residue
that would be left for the owners in a hypothetical liquidation after satisfaction of creditors' claims (by conven-
tion, then, assets equals the sum of liabilities and owners' accounts). See id. The firm's balance sheet also
includes the assets and liabilities of any other entity controlled by the firm. See, e.g., Goldman Sachs Group,
Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 110 (Jan. 28, 2008) (demonstrating a balance sheet entitled "The Goldman
Sachs Group, Inc. and Subsidiaries, Consolidated Statement of Financial Condition"). A widely used example
of a balance sheet can be found on the SEC's annual 10K form. See, e.g., id.
81. See Adrian & Shin, supra note 77, at 3 (explaining how banks use liabilities to obtain additional capital
to lend).
82. See generally HYMAN P. MINSKY, STABILIZING AN UNSTABLE ECONOMY (1986). Although trained as a
macroeconomist, Minsky's emphasis on the liabilities of financial firm situates him closer to institutional stud-
ies of firms: "We must develop economic institutions that constrain and control liability structures, particularly
offinancial institutions and of production processes that require massive capital investment." Id. at 5 (emphasis
added); see also Jose Gabiondo, Leveraged Liquidity: Bear Raids and Junk Loans in the New Credit Market 6
(FlU Legal Stud. Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-01, 2008), available at http://ssrn.comlabstract
=1141955 (interpreting Minsky's classification of liabilities as a framework for entity and market liquidity risk).
83. Financial intermediation means that banks and other firms that borrow to lend act as the middleman
between the ultimate sources and the ultimate uses of funds. GARY GORTON & ANDREW WINTON, WHARTON
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banking regulation, which has always recognized that how banks finance them-
selves bears directly on the products that they will offer others and, thus, on their
ability to survive. 4 For that reason, federal rules limit the type and absolute
amount of leveraging a bank can undertake by imposing regulatory capital
requirements.85
Since the New Deal, federal law enforced a strict separation between the com-
mercial banking and securities business models.86 Commercial banks and some
specialized credit institutions like thrifts were able to help finance themselves by
taking federally-insured customer deposits.8 7 The federal government took an ac-
tive interest in these depository institutions and sheltered them from open compe-
tition by protecting their franchise rights and offering financial resources through
FIN. INSTS. CTR., FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 2 (2002), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/
02/0228.pdf (describing financial intermediaries as firms that "borrow from one group of agents and lend to
another group of agents"). To appreciate my argument, you have to see that lenders must also persuade other
firms to invest in them. See id. Consumers tend to relate to banks as borrowers, actual or prospective; if
successful in getting the bank to make a loan, this loan is reflected (booked) on the bank's balance sheet as an
asset. See generally id. at 3 (loans are "[oin the asset side of the balance sheet").
Consider the following example. You are in the market for a house, must borrow most of the acquisition
cost, and prefer a mortgage with a 30-year term. A shorter term would mean that you would have to refinance
more often. For example, if you bought your residence by making a series of increasingly smaller one year loans
(smaller because you pay some principal each year), each year you would be exposed to whatever the then-
prevailing interest rate was in the open market. You find a bank willing to lend to you for thirty years. Assume
that the bank gets the cash to disburse the loan not from its cash reserves but, rather, by borrowing the money
to make the loan to you, and that the term of the loan to the bank is one year. Once you have your thirty year
loan, the interest payments will trickle in to the bank; but, if it has financed the loan to you by borrowing at
one year, then one year's worth of your repayment will not cover the payment obligation that the borrowing
bank faces when its one year obligation becomes due. See id. (noting that "the maturity of loan contracts is
typically longer than the maturity of the debt on the liability side of the balance sheet").
As a professional lender and borrower, though, the bank is in a better position to compete for financing.
See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("Stabilization Act"), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5240-5262 (2006)
(authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to establish the Troubled Assets Relief Program, which provides
capital injections to major banks "on such terms and conditions" as determined appropriate by the Secretary);
12 C.F.R. § 201.4 (2008) (regulation allowing depository institutions access to short-term, back-up sources of
funding). The bank is a repeat player with substantial knowledge about the credit business. See Joao F. Cocco et
al., Lending Relationships in the Interbank Market, 18 J. FIN. INTERMEDIATION 24, 24 (2009) (explaining that
many interactions between economic agents are frequent and repeating). It enjoys a scale economy of borrow-
ing large sums to fund many smaller loans to consumers. Robert Charles Clark, The Soundness of Financial
Intermediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1, 38 n.114 (1976) ("Empirical studies of bank costs and scale efficiencies agree that
there are economies of scale in banking. . . ."). Moreover, it enjoys nonmarket access to cash and credit from
the federal government, reducing the bank's risk of speculating in mismatches between its loans (accounts
receivables) and its borrowings (accounts payable). See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 201.4.
84. But see Joe Nocera, So When Will Banks Give Loans?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25, 2008, at B I (discussing the
failure of JPMorgan Chase to increase lending despite receiving a capital injection from the federal
government).
85. See GORTON & WINTON, supra note 83, at 97 (documenting various changes to federal law regarding
bank capital requirements).
86. See Gregory C. Menefee, Comment, Securities Activities Under the Glass-Steagall Act, 35 EMORY L.J.
463, 471-73 (1986) (discussing the risks of combining commercial banking with investment banking and
reasons why Congress required the two activities be separated).
87. See generally 12 U.S.C. § 90 (2006) ("[Blanking associations ... shall be depositories of public
money").
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exclusive non-market facilities like the Federal Reserve's discount window."8 In ex-
change for these special funding rights, depository institutions refrained from cer-
tain lines of business, notably securities underwriting, market-making, and
speculation. 9 To conduct those riskier activities, a depository institution had to
organize as an investment bank.90 As an investment bank, it would still be regu-
lated-by the SEC rather than by federal banking authorities-but investment
banks received no preferential treatment when it came to their funding and
liquidity.9
Enterprising firms (and accommodating regulators, notably the Comptroller of
the Currency) found ways to finesse the separation between commercial and invest-
ment banking.92 Commercial banks, for example, staked out a profitable business
line as counterparties for clients by writing financial derivatives, instruments that
bore at least a passing resemblance to those regulated by the SEC. 3 These cross-
over business lines, though, took place on the margin because the statutory divide
between commercial and investment banking survived legal, regulatory, and policy
challenges.94 This is not to say that markets respected the dividing line, given that
practices like securitization and the rise of secondary markets for credit helped to
blur the line between the conventional credit underwriting that had been the pur-
view of banking agencies and the capital markets regulated by the SEC.9
88. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 347b(a) (allowing Federal Reserve banks to make loans to member banks at the
prevailing Federal Reserve discount rate).
89. Depository institutions did not "trade" their special treatment by promising not to engage in invest-
ment bank activities; they were prohibited from doing so by law. See Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-
66, 48 Stat. 162 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C).
90. The Glass-Steagall Act separated the respective activities of commercial banks and investment banks.
William L. Scott & Michael F. Lockett, Commercial Banks' Expanding Into Securities Underwriting: The Equity
Market's Risk Assessment, J. ECON. & FIN., Fall 1992, at 37, 37.
91. In contrast to depository institutions which received significant preferential treatment. See supra note
90 and accompanying text.
92. See Gary Rice, An Overview of U.S. Regulation of Depository Institutions, in A GUIDE TO BANKING AND
FINANCIAL SERVICES LAW AND REGULATION 2008, at 11, 14-15 (Practising L. Inst., 2008) (outlining a number
of changes that took place in private financial practices as well as in the interpretation of federal statutes).
93. Eugene A. Ludwig, Remarks before the Inst. of Int'l Bankers, reprinted in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES
MARKETS app. 8 at 384, 385 (PRACTISING L. INST., 1994) (discussing the use of swaps, "a tool to change their
floating rate obligations into fixed rate obligations and vice versa[,j" by banks as a means of intermediation);
James J. Baechle, Expansion of Bank Securities Activities, in BANKING LAW AND REGULATION 241, 254-64 (Prac-
tising L. Inst., 1987) (reviewing several rulings that "permit( ] non-bank subsidiaries of a bank holding compa-
nies [sic) to engage in securities placement and underwriting activities provided the subsidiaries are not in
violation of section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act"); see also Sec. Indus. Ass'n v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 807 F.2d 1052 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (finding that commercial banks do not violate the Glass-Steagall
Act by placing commercial papers as such actions are not the same as selling securities).
94. The statutory framework set up by the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 was not updated until the passage of
the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999). Rice, supra note 92, at 15
("Congress considered and failed to enact financial modernization legislation in every session between 1978
and 1999. Finally, in 1999 Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act ("GLBA"), the key provisions of which
took effect on March 11, 2000.").
95. See Stephen J. Costino, Swimming in New Waters: Bank Participation in Securitized Loan Pools, 66
UMKC L. REv. 543, 546 (1997) (explaining the beginnings of commercial bank securitization of home mort-
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In 1999, Congress abolished many of the major parts of the divide between com-
mercial and investment banking with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, making it pos-
sible for financial firms to organize themselves in conglomerates96 that more closely
resembled the universal banking that had prevailed in firms like the House of Mor-
gan before the New Deal.97 This wave of deregulation coincided with other trends
that would combine to fuel the credit cycle that had begun before the Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act and that would not contract until the summer of 2007.98 The stage
had been set for the shifts in business models that are the focus of this essay.
From the perspective of a lender, assets include loans made to customers, since
these loans are financial claims of the lender against the customer who has a con-
tractual duty to provide the lender with value.99 As the financial condition of many
customers declined, the financial quality of these loan assets also declined.' 0 To
boost sagging values, the government might have propped them up, as Chairman
Bernanke had suggested when arguing for buying them from the banks at a dra-
matically higher price that reflected their hypothetical long-term value rather than
their value as marked-to-market.1 '" Instead, regulators opted to intervene in how
gages and the expansion of securitization into other commercial banking markets such as auto loans and credit
card debt). Commercial banking's foray into securitization also extended into the "brokerage of mutual funds,
private placement transactions, and investment advice" as a result of many of the decisions made by the Comp-
troller of Currency and the failure of Congress to modernize the Glass-Steagall Act to address the new invest-
ment vehicles. Id. at 551.
96. Timothy R. McTaggart, Financial Services Modernization Legislation: One for the Century, If Not for the
Ages, BANK ACCT. & FIN., Winter 1999-2000, at 31, 31.
97. See RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN: AN AMERICAN BANKING DYNASTY AND THE RISE OF
MODERN FINANCE (2001). The operative part of a business model is strategic, involving a wager about future
outcomes that hang in the balance. See, e.g., Rob Garver, Bank of America is First to Seek Approval to Move
Insurance Unit to HQ City, AM. BANKER, Dec. 29, 1999, at 2 ("Bank of America's move may simply have been
the one that made sense from a management perspective."). It was a strategic view about future outcomes that
led Citigroup and Travelers Insurance to merge in 1998, a view that assumed that it would be profitable to
combine banking and insurance businesses because of a scope efficiency. But see Sean P. Cover, Citibank-
Travelers Merger was a Big Mistake, TREASURY Bus., Jan. 12, 2009, available at http://treasurybusiness.com/
2009/01/12/citibank-travelers-merger-was-a-big-mistake (stating that the merger was intended to create an "in-
ternational financial powerhouse" but that the results never materialized).
98. See NIKOLA SPATAFORA, INT'L MONETARY FUND, WORLD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: HOUSING AND THE
BUSINESS CYCLE 65 (demonstrating the contraction of the credit market starting in 2007 through empirical
data); Erik F. Gerding, The Next Epidemic: Bubbles and the Growth and Decay of Securities Regulation, 38 CONN.
L. REV. 393, 414-15 (2006) (discussing the economic boom of the 1990s in the context of securities bubbles).
99. David Scott Blake, Comment, "Rational" Inner City Disinvestment: A Critique of Lenders' Negative Eco-
nomic Rights and a Foucaultian Analysis of Creditworthiness Evaluation, 2 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 303,
309 (1995). See also United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 852 (1996) (considering loans to be a thrift's
principal assets); S. Bancorporation, Inc. v. United States, 732 F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1984) (including loans in a
listing of a bank's assets).
100. Jonathan Cary et al., Acquisition Financing: The Current Landscape Causes and Consequences of the US
Credit Crunch, in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 2008: WHAT You NEED TO KNOW 513, 518-19 (Practising L. Inst.,
2008) (detailing how the rise in borrower defaults led to a decrease in the value of bank assets and securitized
debt obligations).
101. See Rachel Beck, Risks Abound with Fed-backed Bear Stearns' Loan, TULSA WORLD, Apr. 6, 2008, at E5.
Bernanke has even gone as far as to say that if the government were to buy the sagging assets in a calculated
way, eventually the government would make a profit on the venture. Id.
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banks finance themselves (as reflected on the right-hand side of their balance
sheet).2 This illustrates how federal responses to the credit crisis have emphasized
adjustments to the capital structure of financial firms rather than to their asset
portfolios." 3 This has involved both liability financing at preferred rates with and
without recourse, equity investment through preferred stock, and investment in
stock options of these recapitalized financial firms.0 4 In effect, these interventions
amounted to a partial recapitalization of the financial sector, although the Emer-
gency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 ("Stabilization Act") was marketed to
Main Street as a benefit for the average consumer."5
At first, regulators responded to the financial crisis as in the past by making debt
more cheaply available through the discount window and other loan facilities. 6
The cost of debt financing was cheapened by lowering interest rates (which the
Federal Reserve did seven times between September 18, 2007 and April 30, 2008)
for federal funds and discount window borrowing, facilities that directly benefit
only the bank members of the Federal Reserve.' Cheap debt financing was also
extended to investment banks.' Cheap equity capital was also made available to
financial firms using the statutory authority conferred to the Treasury and the Fed-
eral Reserve under the Stabilization Act, which created the Troubled Assets Relief
102. See Ben Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, Address at the London School of Economics: The Crisis
and the Response (Jan. 13, 2009) (transcript available through FX International ProFeed, AFX News Limited)
(discussing how the lowering of the federal funds rate and the discount rate by the Federal Reserve would help
banks finance themselves).
103. See The Fed's Evolving Liquidity Toolkit, REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/bonds
News/idUSN2635039920081202?sp=true [hereinafter Fed's Toolkit] (listing federal regulatory responses to the
current crisis which promoted the capital structure of commercial firms); see also Michael P. Malloy, The
Subprime Mortgage Crisis and Bank Regulation, BANKING & FIN. POL'Y REP., Mar. 2008 at 1, 4-5 (listing further
proposed Treasury regulatory responses to the crisis).
104. See Fed's Toolkit, supra note 103.
105. See Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Treasury, Testimony Before the Senate Banking Com-
mittee on Turmoil in US Credit Markets: Recent Actions Regarding Government Sponsored Entities, Invest-
ment Banks and other Financial Institutions, (Sept. 23, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releasesl
hpl 153.htm. Secretary Paulson indicated that the Act was a "bold approach [that] will cost American families
far less than the alternative" and that the "troubled asset purchase program on its own is the single most
effective thing we can do to help homeowners, the American people and stimulate our economy." Id.
106. See Bernanke, supra note 102 (indicating that at first the federal government tried to ease the credit
crunch by lowering the discount and federal fund rates); Fed's Toolkit, supra note 103 (giving a timeline of the
different activities federal regulatory agencies have implemented to ameliorate the crisis).
107. Stephen G. Cecchetti, Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008,
at 12-13 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14134, 2008) (listing cuts to the target federal
funds rate and the primary lending rate).
108. See Allan Sloan, On the Brink of Disaster, FORTUNE, Apr. 14, 2008, at 78, 82 (analyzing federal regula-
tory responses to the credit crisis). The Federal Reserve added three new credit facilities after the effects of the
credit crunch beginning in 2007 became more serious:
The three newbies-the term auction lending facility, the primary-dealer credit facility, and the term
securities lending facility-total more than half-a-trillion dollars, with more if needed. Much of this
money is available not only to commercial banks [Fed members], but also to investment banks,
which normally aren't allowed to borrow from the Fed.
Id.
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Program ("TARP"). °9 When lobbying for TARP, the Treasury and its allies had
said-as memorialized in the statutory title-that appropriated funds would shore
up the value of bank assets, that way stabilizing the firms and, indirectly, the credit
market."0 No asset purchases had materialized, though, by the end of 2008 because
the administration had decided to use TARP funds to buy preferred stock and op-
tions in financial institutions."' This about-face came as a surprise for many and is
part of the reason why oversight reports by the Government Accountability Office
and the Congressional Oversight Panel have criticized TARP."
2
As of December 16, 2008, the U.S. Department of the Treasury had spent about
$170 billion on preferred stock and options in financial institutions."3 At first,
these institutions had squawked at the terms demanded by Treasury as a condition
to buying preferred shares; these protests, though, seem disingenuous given how
badly these banks needed to de-leverage and how much more favorable than mar-
ket terms the Treasury's conditions were.' Indeed, the preferred stock issued to the
Treasury reassured the bondholders of these firms and the chastened credit rating
agencies that were standing ready (too late, it would seem) to downgrade the credit
ratings of these firms."' Without the Treasury infusion, some or much of the com-
109. 12 U.S.C.S. §§ 5240-5262 (2008). I think of it as the administration's "No Bank Left Behind" program.
110. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Interim Assistant Secretary for Financial Stability Neel
Kashkari Review of the Financial Market Crisis and the Troubled Assets Relief Program, HP 1349 (Jan. 13,
2009), available at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1349.htm [hereinafter Treasury Review] (explaining
that when asking Congress for the TARP funding, the Treasury "focused on a two part plan: one, our initial,
market-based plan to purchase illiquid mortgage assets as a means to attract private capital to the financial
system, and two, providing sufficient flexibility to deal with any individual contingencies that arose.").
111. See U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, TRANSACTION REPORT, CAPITAL PURCHASE PROGRAM (2008), avail-
able at http://www.ustreas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/CPPTransactionReportDecl6.pdf [hereinafter TRANSAC-
TION REPORT]; see also Treasury Review, supra note 110 (explaining that the original plan to purchase mortgage
assets was changed to "[plurchasing equity in healthy banks around the country [because it] would be a faster
and more direct way to inject much-needed capital into the system and restore confidence compared with asset
purchases").
112. See, e.g., U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF PROGRAM: ADDITIONAL Ac-
TIONS NEEDED TO BETTER ENSURE INTEGRITY, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND TRANSPARENCY, GAO-09-161 (2008),
available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09161.pdf CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL FOR ECONOMIC
STABILIZATION, QUESTIONS ABOUT THE $700 BILLION ECONOMIC STABILIZATION FUNDS: FIRST REPORT OF THE
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL FOR ECONOMIC STABILIZATION (2008), available at http://www.house.gov/
apps/list/hearing/financialsvcs -dem/cop121008.pdf.
113. See TRANSACTION REPORT, supra note 111.
114. See Deborah Solomon et al., U.S. to Buy Stakes in Nation's Largest Banks, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 2008, at
Al (indicating the initial hesitancy, soon followed by acceptance of the CCP program); U.S. DEP'T OF THE
TREASURY, TRANCHE REPORT TO CONGRESS FOR THE PERIOD THROUGH Nov. 14, 2008, at 2 (2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/initiatives/eesa/docs/TransactionReport-l1212008.pdf (noting that by Nov. 14, 2008,
thirty financial institutions had signed final agreements with the Treasury to participate in the program).
115. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, Fact Sheet: Treasury Senior Preferred Stock Purchase
Agreement (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/pspa-factsheet-090708
%20hpl 128.pdf (stating that the Treasury's purpose for purchasing stock in some government sponsored enter-
prises was to add "to market stability by providing additional security to GSE debt holders"); see also generally
Press Release, The W'ilber Corp., The Wilber Corporation & Wilber National Bank Plan to Help Capitalize
Upstate Economy (Dec. 5, 2008), available at http://www.wilberbank.com/PDFFiles/ccprelease.pdf (stating that
with the firm's acceptance of Treasury funds "will benefit our shareholders and customers"); Press Release,
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mon stock value (the residuary value) of these firms would have evaporated, as it
had already begun to do." 6 Besides, the preferred stock gave the Treasury virtually
none of the voting and governance benefits that come with common stock."7
B. The Feedback Loop Between Market Liquidity and Firm Asset and Liability
Structure
The second important feedback loop is that between the liquidity dynamics in the
open market and the liquidity management practices of financial firms, because
liquidity became important during this crisis and because these market liquidity
dynamics were relatively new and quite potent in both the primary and secondary
credit markets."' Even loan origination in the primary market reflected the tug of
secondary market liquidity because it lulled lenders away from rigorous underwrit-
ing standards to the extent that an originating lender expected that the loan could
be dumped in the secondary market." 9 As it turned out, these great expectations
about secondary markets were justified on the boom-side of the credit cycle (that is
when Ponzi schemes work), but not as the bubble was bursting. 2 '
These expectations also got a boost from credit default swaps issued by invest-
ment-grade firms (notably American Insurance Group ("AIG"), but there were
others).' 2' Originating lenders and investors that had purchased structured credit
Bridge Bancorp, Inc., Bridge Bancorp, Inc. Considers Participation in Capital Purchase Program (Nov. 3,
2008), available at http://www.globenewswire.com/newsroom/news.html?d=153738 (claiming that the funds
are an "opportunit[y] benefiting our shareholders, customers and the greater communities we serve.").
116. Cf Sara Lepro & Tim Paradis, Stocks Trading Mixed Following Pledge from Treasury Department to
Prevent Automaker Collapse, MAss. Bus. NEWS, Dec. 12, 2008, http://www.masslive.com/news/index.ssf/2008/
12/stocks trading-mixed -following.html?category=business (demonstrating this phenomenon as it occurred
with the automobile industry). After a similar bail-out bill for the automobile industry failed in the Senate,
auto stock prices fell sharply, hurting stockholders. Id. However, "after the Treasury Department said it would
step in to prevent a collapse of the nation's Big Three automakers[,] ... [sltocks came off of sharp early losses
and fluctuated in a more moderate range." Id.
117. Press Release, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, TARP Capital Purchase Program: Senior Preferred Stock and
Warrants: Summary of Senior Preferred Terms (Nov. 17, 2008), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
reports/document5hp1207.pdf (explaining the lack of voting rights associated with the Treasury's stock
purchases).
118. See Daniel Cunningham et al., An Introduction to OTC Derivatives, in SWAPS AND OTHER DERIVATIVES
IN 1994, 121, 282-84 (Practising L. Inst., 1994) (explaining the liquidity risks that banks face when dealing in
derivative vehicles).
119. Christopher E. Ware & Laura Gramling Perez, Main Street Meets Wall Street: The Mortgage Meltdown,
Wis. LAw., Dec. 2008, at 1, 10, available at http://www.wisbar.org/AM/Template.cfn?Section=Wisconsin-
Lawyer&template=/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&contentid=68942 ("At its worst, securitization shifts default risk
away from those who can best assess it, encourages lenders (and the brokers they hire) to write risky loans, and
leads to fraud.").
120. See id. at 9-11 (arguing that the housing boom and bust occurred when the "securitization process
began to work in reverse").
121. See Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 220-21 (2008). Schwarcz defines a credit-
default swap as an agreement
under which one party agrees, in exchange for receiving a fee paid by a second party, to assume the
credit risk of certain debt obligations of a specified borrower or other obligor. If a 'credit event' (for
example, default or bankruptcy) occurs in respect of that obligor, the first party will either (i) pay the
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products in the secondary market used these swaps to insure the value of their
credit exposures.'22 So long as the swaps counterparty had an acceptable credit
rating, swaps buyers could carry these credit exposures at their par value rather
than at a marked-to-market discount that reflected ongoing deterioration in the
borrower's credit.'23 In this way, swaps postponed the day of reckoning. Adding
uncertainty to the picture were indeterminate amounts of liquidity in relatively
unregulated firms, such as sovereign wealth funds and hedge funds.'24 These liquid-
ity pools intensified financial euphoria by making it seem that markets were, in-
deed, "awash" with capital. 2 ' Also, overheated secondary markets encouraged the
mistaken idea that robust secondary trading of a firm's debt (a form of market
liquidity) was a proxy for the firm's own liquidity, i.e., its ongoing ability to timely
meet its obligations to make maturing payments.'26
And this market liquidity encouraged firms to borrow more heavily than before
because liquid trading markets meant easier credit for firms.'27 After all, financial
firms' lenders also over-relied on secondary market euphoria when underwriting
questionable credits. 2 ' Deep market liquidity may also have encouraged firms to
over-value some of their financial assets, because the upside of a bubble can pro-
duce financial "contagion" in terms of distorting asset values upward, just as the
second party an amount calculated by reference to post-default value of the debt obligations or (ii)
buy the debt obligations (or other eligible debt obligations of the obligor) for their full face value
from the second party.
Id. (internal citation omitted).
122. Id. (claiming that a credit-default swap is the "most widely used derivative instrument" for the purpose
of decreasing investor risk).
123. See, e.g., Robert O'Harrow Jr. & Brady Dennis, The Beautiful Machine, WASH. POST, Dec. 29, 2008, at
Al (stating that AIG's AAA credit rating "sent a resounding signal to clients that they could always sleep well at
night, that AIG was in no danger of failing"); John C. Hull & Alan White, Valuing Credit Default Swaps I. No
Counterparty Default Risk 3 (NYU Working Paper No. FIN-00-021, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=1295226 (stating that swaps buyers have "the right to sell a particular bond issued by the [seller] for its par
value when a credit event occurs").
124. See, e.g., Mathew Phillips, The Monster that Ate Wall Street, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46 ("Since
credit default swaps are privately negotiated contracts between two parties and aren't regulated by the govern-
ment, there's no central reporting mechanism to determine their value.").
125. See, e.g., Stephen Labaton, Agency's '04 Rule Let Banks Pile Up New Debt, and Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3,
2008, at Al (observing how changes to the SEC's regulation of Wall Street allowed investment institutions to
"unshackle billions of dollars held in reserve as a cushion against losses on their investments").
126. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola et al., What Went Wrong, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008, at Al (calculating that
"Itlhe global derivatives market topped $530 trillion" by June 2008); Eduaro Levy Yeyati et al., Emerging Market
Liquidity and Crises 2 (The World Bank Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper No. 4445, 2007)
(observing that in periods of financial turbulence, high volumes of trading may not represent a healthy
market).
127. Cf. Yuri Kim, Comment, Primary Dealers Credit Facility: Changes for Market Liquidity, ILL. Bus. L.J.,
Apr. 21, 2008, available at http://www.typepad.com/t/trackback/253461/28270590 (observing the link between
market liquidity and lending).
128. Cf Binyamin Appelbaum & Ellen Nakashima, Banking Regulator Played Advocate Over Enforcer, WASH.
POST, Nov. 23, 2008, at Al (finding that, encouraged by the housing boom, lenders were providing loans to
previously unqualified buyers).
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downside can distort values downward.' On the asset side of the firm's balance
sheet, escalating asset values in liquid secondary market trading made it easier for
financial firms to "assume away" the possibility that the bubble would ever burst,
encouraging the growth of financial products created from complex mathematical
finance models that had never been tested in a significant market downturn. 3 °
As firms adjusted their business practices to account for market liquidity, regula-
tors also began to experiment with their own interventions on behalf of financial
stability. 3' From the very beginning, these interventions sought to restore market
liquidity, a tacit admission to the fact that, after the OTD model and the rise of
non-bank financial institutions, whether the credit trading market was sufficiently
liquid was as much a regulatory concern as the safety and soundness of particular
institutions.132 That is, regulators would protect not only firms that were too big to
fail, but also market mechanisms that were too important to become locked-up.'33
So the Federal Reserve targeted neuralgic liquidity points, including AIG, whose
large portfolio of credit default swaps supported the assets of banks that could
afford no more sagging.'34 Another liquidity pressure point was the guarantee of
money market mutual funds that, along with commercial paper and repurchase
agreements, had always been a citadel of market liquidity.' So, it would seem that
many non-bank financial institutions were now "special."
Granted, the Federal Reserve did not reach this conclusion easily. At first, it stuck
to its familiar pattern of cutting interest rates and sounding a cautious note about
129. Cf Laura E. Kodres & Matthew Pritsker, A Rational Expectations Model of Financial Contagion, 52 J.
FIN. 769, 770 (2002) ("[Pirice changes in one market are perceived as having implications for the values of
assets in other markets, causing their prices to change as well.").
130. Value of PE Assets Plunge in Secondary Market, FIN. WK., Jan. 5, 2009, available at http://
www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=120090105/REG/901059976 (noting that, "at the peak of the
private equity bubble in 2006-7, asset commanded prices above [net asset value (NAV),]" whereas prices fell to
61% of NAV for the second half of 2008); Jill Drew, Frenzy, WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2008, at Al ("The computer
modelers gushed about the tranches. The layers spread out the risk. Only a catastrophic failure would bring the
structure crashing down, and the models said that wouldn't happen.").
131. See, e.g., Mark Felsenthal, Fed to Boost Auctions, Pay Interest on Reserves, REUTERS, Oct. 6, 2008, availa-
ble at http://www.reuters.com/article/topNews/idUSTRE4953X520081006 (reporting the efforts of the Federal
Reserve to help market liquidity).
132. See, e.g., Timothy Geithner, President & CEO, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Welcoming Remarks at the
Second N.Y. Fed-Princeton University Liquidity Conference: Restoring Market Liquidity in a Financial Crisis
(Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://www.newyorkfed.orglnewsevents/speeches/2007/geiO71213.html ("The ac-
tions to address liquidity issues . . . can help reinforce our monetary policy actions by providing greater
assurance for market participants of access to funding.").
133. Id.
134. See Gretchen Morgenson, Behind Biggest Insurer's Crisis, A Blind Eye to a Web of Risk, N.Y. TIMES, Sep.
28, 2008, at A1("[l~f A.I.G. unspooled, so could some of the mightiest enterprises in the world."); Brady Dennis
& Robert O'Harrow Jr., A Crack in the System, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2008, at Al ("AIG's position at the nexus
of [many of the credit default swap] deals meant that it could not be allowed to fail.").
135. Investopedia.com, Introduction to Money Market Mutual Funds, http://www.investopedia.com/arti-
cles/mutualfund/04/081104.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2009) ("Money market mutual funds offer ultimate safety
and liquidity. This means that investors will have an expected sum of cash at the very moment that they need
it.").
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future rate cuts to avoid inflationary expectations.'36 When these rate cuts had little
effect, the Federal Reserve took a big step by letting an investment bank tap the
discount window, albeit through a Federal Reserve member bank conduit.'37 Only
when this unconventional use of the discount window failed to restore much confi-
dence in the credit market did federal regulators join ranks to call for a more radi-
cal intervention.'38 It came in the form of the Stabilization Act,'39 which, other than
authorizing the public borrowing needed to finance the Act's authorities, said little
about how the appropriated funds would be used, suggesting that economic theory
was to take a back seat to transactional pragmatism. 4 If the markets could be
stabilized (at virtually any fiscal cost, it seemed), the theory behind the interven-
tions would follow.
IV. IMPLICATIONS
As the financial crisis continues to unfold (and, eventually, resolve), many explana-
tory frameworks will compete for the attention of academics and regulators. 4'
Here, I have argued that a business model approach helps to extract insight from
the evolving structure of financial firms and to situate questions about regulatory
policy in the dynamic context of actual commercial practices.'42 Because it puts
firm structure in the context of interdependent variables, this approach emphasizes
how these variables influence each other in reciprocal fashion: the firm acts strate-
gically in the market, which comes to reflect the aggregate of firm action; yet mar-
ket constraints frame (and limit) the firm's strategic freedom of action.'43
The variable that I emphasized was liquidity but the analysis could include other
factors too, for example the participation of foreign lenders and borrowers in a
local credit market.' I focused on how these firms finance themselves because it is
through their borrowing, in particular, that financial intermediaries serve their so-
136. See Fed. Reserve Bd., Open Market Operations, http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm
(last visited Feb. 1, 2009) (showing a steady decline in the federal funds rate of at least 25% at each meeting of
the Federal Open Market Committee between September 18, 2007 and December 16, 2008).
137. See Press Release, Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., Summary of Terms and Conditions Regarding the
JPMorgan Chase Facility (Mar. 24, 2008), available at http://newyorkfed.org/newsevents/news/markets/2008/
rp080324b.html (describing the Federal Reserve's $29 billion loan to JPMorgan Chase).
138. Cf The $2 Bail-Out, THE ECONOMIST, Mar. 22, 2008, at 81 ("The new Fed window is untested and the
very act of drawing on it could rattle markets."); Michael M. Grynbaum, Bailout Unnerves Investors, and Shares
Take Steep Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at Al (explaining that the Bear Stearns bailout did nothing to
improve market confidence).
139. 12 U.S.C. §§ 5240-5262 (2006).
140. Id. See also Letter from Group of Economists to Congress (Sept. 24, 2008), available at http://
faculty.chicagogsb.edu/john.cochranelresearch/Paperslmortgage-protest.htm (protesting the ambiguity of the
bailout bill).
141. See supra Part I.
142. See supra Part II.
143. See supra Part II.
144. See supra Part lI.B.
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cial role of brokering the flow of funds. 41 Whether or not this brokering goes on
will probably determine whether banks are still special and whether non-bank
firms come to be viewed as special too.146 Although the jury is still out on this
question as far as any major reform of banking law, the Federal Reserve and the
Treasury have been treating a wider range of firms than before as special financial
intermediaries. 47 In time, though, regulators too will have to stabilize their re-
sponses. 4 When the dust has settled, a new conceptual model of the credit market
will have emerged, one that restates the business of banking.
145. See supra Part M.lA.
146. See supra Part IL.
147. See supra Parts 11-1l1,
148. See supra Part liIIA.
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